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Righting the Wrong of Publicity: A Novel
Proposal for a Uniform Federal Right of
Publicity Statute
Alex J. Berger*
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Licensing
Litigation highlights the enlargement of protection of celebrities’ “identities” under
California’s right of publicity scheme. A comparison of California’s and New York’s
right of publicity laws exposes the wider issues that cause confusion and uncertainty
regarding right of publicity throughout the country. Such issues include ambiguous
definitions of “identity,” conflicts with federal copyright law, jurisdictional problems,
and First Amendment free speech issues. This Note explores the roots of right of
publicity law and how its current forms foment disarray across the nation. Paying
particularly close attention to California and New York, where right of publicity cases
are rife, and the law varies greatly, this Note argues for a uniform federal right of
publicity statute. Further, this Note sets out a novel approach for a statute that
incorporates the original economic rationale behind right of publicity law and a number
of carve outs designed to protect artists’ First Amendment rights. Such a statute would
inject much needed uniformity and fairness into a fractured system.

* J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of California Hastings College of the Law. I wish to thank
Professor Ben Depoorter for his invaluable mentorship and advice in the creation of this Note. A
special thanks to my sister and mother, whose staunch opposition to my decision to go to law school
ultimately convinced me to apply; and my father who supported me all the way.
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Introduction
In 2013, in In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness
Licensing Litigation (Keller), the Ninth Circuit held that videogame
maker EA Sports’ use of the likeness of former National Collegiate
Athletic Association (“NCAA”) player Samuel Keller in a popular
videogame constituted a violation of his right of publicity.1 The decision
in Keller highlights the existing uncertainty with regard to the right of
publicity among district and circuit courts.2
The Ninth Circuit has led a trend of broadly applying the common
law right of publicity to works that merely “evoke” a celebrity’s image in
addition to the statutory right that covers name, signature, likeness, and

1. 724 F.3d 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 2013).
2. See Kent Jordan & Robert Wilkinson, Note, A Review of 2011 Video-Game Litigation and
Selected Cases, 15 SMU Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 271, 274 (2012); see also Talor Bearman, Note, Intercepting
Licensing Rights: Why College Athletes Need a Federal Right of Publicity, 15 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L.
85, 88 (2012). Compare, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding
celebrity singer’s right of publicity violated due to unremunerated value of her voice where a voice
similar to hers was used in a car commercial), with Chambers v. Time Warner, No. 00-Civ.-2839 (JSR),
2003 WL 749422, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2003) (declaring a celebrity’s right of publicity violated when
the publication is patently false or used in a “blatant, ‘selfish commercial exploitation’”). The term
“right of publicity” refers to common law and/or statutory rights to protect and benefit from the value
of one’s “identity.”
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voice.3 Meanwhile, courts within the Ninth Circuit have departed from
the traditional “transformative use” exception within right of publicity
jurisprudence to focus on depictions of the plaintiff and completely
ignore whether the allegedly infringing work was transformed as a whole,
resulting in a new work not fully dependent on the celebrity’s depiction.4
As a result of this approach to the right of publicity, Keller leaves
noncommercial works of art, such as films, books, and paintings,
vulnerable to right of publicity attacks from celebrities and their estates,
which threatens artists’ First Amendment rights to free speech.5
Other courts have taken a fundamentally different approach to such
right of publicity disputes and have modeled their analyses instead on the
Lanham Act,6 which regulates trademarks. The Second Circuit and New
York state courts, for instance, commonly reject claims in which the
defendant has not used the celebrity’s likeness to endorse a specific product
and sustain claims where the defendant used the likeness for “blatant
‘selfish commercial exploitation.’”7
The current circuit split and various approaches to the right of
publicity in different states put many artists and companies at an unfair
disadvantage. Confusion over which states’ right of publicity applies,
coupled with the uncertainty of whether a work falls under exceptions
carved out by the different courts, leads to the stifling of innovation and
unfair competition in certain artistic markets.8 This uncertainty is further
complicated because most statutory and common law right of publicity
laws conflict with existing copyright law. For example, several actors
have successfully brought right of publicity claims involving characters
who they have played, even though said characters were legally licensed
to others through copyright agreements.9
3. E.g., White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc. (White I), 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992); No Doubt
v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 409 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West 2014).
4. Davis v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 10-03328 RS, 2012 WL 3860819, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012);
Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276. The transformative use exception is an “affirmative defense that the work is
protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it contains significant transformative elements or that the
value of the work does not derive primarily from the celebrity’s fame.” Davis, 2012 WL 3860819, at *3
(quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001)) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (discussing the transformative use exception as applied by California courts).
5. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1290 (Thomas, J., dissenting). I refer to works of art apart from purely
commercial speech, in which the likeness is not used to endorse the purchase of a particular product.
6. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2015).
7. Chambers, 2003 WL 749422, at *5; see Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1049 (2d
Cir. 1995) (“Not every use of an individual’s name, portrait, or picture for commercial purposes
without his consent, however, violates [New York’s right of publicity statutes].”). See Rand v. Hearst
Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 405, 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
8. Kevin L. Vick & Jean-Paul Jassy, Why a Federal Right of Publicity Statute Is Necessary,
Comm. Law., Aug. 2011, at 14.
9. See generally Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 199 (2002) (exploring cases brought by characters from the popular television shows
Cheers and The Little Rascals).
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Because right of publicity laws vary significantly from state to state,
and their application by different courts produces inconsistent results, this
Note argues that Congress should create an all-encompassing federal
right of publicity statute. An effective statute should include a carve out
for authors’ use of celebrity likenesses in “noncommercial” transformative
works to protect authors’ First Amendment right to free expression. This
proposal conforms to many Second Circuit decisions, which rightly limit
right of publicity claims to protecting celebrities’ right to be free from
unauthorized commercial use of their likenesses while allowing authors to
create artistic, transformative works without the worry of legal challenges
from celebrities whose likenesses are incorporated into such works.10
This proposed statute would also reverse the Ninth Circuit’s dangerous
trend, typified by its decision in Keller, of elevating the California right
of publicity above First Amendment protections. Furthermore, such a
federal statute would reconcile right of publicity law with copyright law,
inject consistency into the field, and benefit the creative arts industry as a
whole. By balancing the protection of celebrities’ commercial value with
artists’ right to self-expression, this proposed federal statute would
promote the free exchange of ideas and preserve the investment that
celebrities make in their own public personae.
Part I of this Note provides a brief description of the origins and
rationales for the right of publicity and explains its transformation by the
Ninth Circuit’s landmark decision in Keller. Part II examines how the
Keller decision illustrates the overreaching application of California’s
right of publicity to the detriment of the creative arts industry, and
contrasts that system with New York’s statutory right of publicity. Part
III critiques the current state of right of publicity, particularly California’s
“property approach,” and argues that the inconsistent application of the
right of publicity and copyright preemption causes significant confusion
for litigants and courts. Part IV proposes a federal right of publicity
statute as a solution to the fractured and disproportionately applied right of
publicity that currently exists. This proposed statute would protect artist’s
First Amendment rights while simultaneously safeguarding celebrities’
right to profit from their hard-earned public personae.

10. See Arrington v. N.Y. Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (N.Y. 1982) (finding that the New
York equivalent of the statutory right of publicity was drafted “narrowly to encompass only the
commercial use of an individual’s name or likeness and no more”); see also Edme v. Internet Brands,
Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 519, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Kane v. Comedy Partners, No. 00-Civ.-158 (GBD),
2003 WL 22383387, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2003).
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I. Right of Publicity: Early Conceptions
A. Right of Publicity Origins: Privacy Rights
The right of publicity originally evolved out of privacy rights.11 The
right of privacy, as articulated in an 1890 law review article by Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis, protected individuals from the disclosure of
embarrassing private facts.12 The right of privacy also recognized the
right “to be let alone” in the face of the commercial and technological
innovations that increasingly invaded one’s private life.13 However, most
celebrity plaintiffs’ efforts to stop commercial use of their name or
likeness fit poorly into the right of privacy standard.14 Because the right
of privacy was designed to protect “dignitary interests,” as opposed to
economic ones, remedies in privacy cases required a showing of
emotional distress.15 Therefore, courts routinely denied celebrities relief
for the unauthorized use of their names or likenesses because, as the
courts reasoned, celebrities needed and wanted public exposure.16 In
response to the limitations on the right of privacy, William Prosser
outlined the modern right of publicity in 1960, which is defined as the
appropriation of a person’s name or likeness for another’s advantage.17
The actual term “right of publicity” first appeared in the case of
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. in 1953.18 In Haelan,
the Second Circuit first laid out the policy behind the right of publicity:
famous people often receive money for their endorsement of a product,
and if they cannot exclusively assign this right, they might not otherwise
receive payment for services as celebrity advertisers.19

11. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 194–95
(1890). The authors argue for invasion of privacy as a cause of tort action, the underlying premise being
that everyone has a property interest in their personality. Id. at 211.
12. Id. at 215–16 (explaining, in part, that “[t]he general object in view is to protect the privacy of
private life”).
13. Mark Bartholomew, A Right Is Born: Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern Lawmaking,
44 Conn. L. Rev. 301, 309 (2011) (citations omitted); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 11, at 205.
14. Bartholomew, supra note 13, at 310.
15. Id.
16. E.g., O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941) (reasoning that for a
professional football player whose photograph was used in a beer commercial without his permission,
“the publicity he got was only that which he had been constantly seeking and receiving”); Pallas v.
Crowley-Milner & Co., 54 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Mich. 1952) (holding that plaintiff had waived her privacy
right against advertiser because she had become known as a performer and model); see also
1 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 1:25 (2014) (“Locked into the rubric
of a ‘right to be let alone and private,’ privacy law seemed unable to accommodate the claims of those
whose identity was already public.”).
17. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960).
18. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
19. Id. This parallels the Lanham Act’s creation of a false endorsement action with regard to
trademark. See J. Thomas McCarthy & Paul M. Anderson, Protection of the Athlete’s Identity: The
Right of Publicity, Endorsements and Domain Names, 11 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 195, 205–06 (2001).
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The Supreme Court first considered the right of publicity in 1977, in

Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company.20 In Zacchini, the

Court likened the need to protect the commercial value of an entertainer’s
reputation to the economic philosophy that underlies copyright law.21
The Court held that “the protection provides an economic incentive for
[the performer] to make the investment required to produce a performance
of interest to the public.”22
As the right of publicity developed over the years, scholars posited
four key justifications for the right.23 First, the “labor theory,” based on
Lockean principles, postulates that every celebrity achieved her level of
fame through “‘time, effort, skill, and even money’” in the creation of her
public persona, and is thus entitled to the fruits of her labor.24 Therefore,
under this theory, courts should protect celebrities’ right to benefit from
the cultivation of their identities.25
Second, the “economic incentive” rationale—which underlies
copyright, trademark, and patent law—states that “affording protection
to publicity rights induces and encourages people to invest time, effort,
and resources to produce works or products that benefit society.”26 As
Chief Justice Bird stated in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, “providing legal
protection for the economic value in one’s identity against unauthorized
commercial exploitation creates a powerful incentive for expending time
and resources to develop the skills or achievements prerequisite to public
recognition.”27 Some commentators, however, have expressed skepticism
of this theory because of the unlikelihood that endorsement deals for
celebrities provide significant additional incentive to cultivate one’s
identity beyond already lucrative employment contracts.28
Third, and arguably most compelling, the “unjust enrichment”
theory is described as “the straightforward [theory] of preventing unjust
20. 433 U.S. 562, 563 (1977).
21. Id. at 576.
22. Id.
23. Paul Czarnota, The Right of Publicity in New York and California: A Critical Analysis,
19 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 481, 503–13 (2012).
24. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights,
81 Calif. L. Rev. 125, 175 (1993) (connecting theories of John Locke to publicity rights jurisprudence).
25. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (emphasizing the “right of the individual to reap the reward of
his endeavors”); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 438 (Cal. 1979) (recognizing that “[y]ears
of labor may be required before one’s skill, reputation, notoriety or virtues are sufficiently developed
to permit an economic return”); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664
(N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (acknowledging the plaintiff’s proprietary interest in his persona because “[he
had] invested 40 years in developing his personality as Mr. New Year’s Eve”).
26. Czarnota, supra note 23, at 506.
27. 603 P.2d at 441 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
28. See Steven C. Clay, Note, Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State
and Federal Courts, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 505–06 (1994) (arguing against economic incentive
presumption that endorsements provide incentive for athletic greatness); see also Madow, supra note 24,
at 209–10.
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enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose is served by
having the defendant get for free some aspect of the plaintiff that would
have market value and for which he would normally pay.”29 This theory
relies on the idea that the right of publicity protects an individual from
the theft of aspects of her economically valuable identity for the commercial
advantage of another.30
Finally, the fourth justification for right of publicity “derives from
the economic and social importance of the entertainment industr[y].”31
This rationale embraces the idea that because right of publicity actions
are usually filed within the state where the celebrity resides, states that
rely heavily on their entertainment industries have an incentive to
“afford[] strong protection to celebrities, and their publicity rights, to
encourage and foster further growth and development of the respective
entertainment industries.”32
Regardless of which policy is most persuasive, the right of publicity
has rapidly spread throughout the country, taking on various forms in
state statutes or case law.33 As of 2010, thirty-one states recognize the
right of publicity—eleven exclusively through statute, twelve through the
common law, and eight through a combination of the two.34 Currently,
California maintains both a statutory and common law right of
publicity.35 New York, on the other hand, recognizes only a statutory
right.36 California’s right of publicity jurisprudence bears particular scrutiny
given how dramatically this area of law has transformed since its inception.
B. California’s Right of Publicity Pre-KELLER
Prior to Keller, the Ninth Circuit and California courts examining
the state’s right of publicity law often granted right of publicity claims

29. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 326, 331 (1966) (citing “unjust enrichment” as compelling justification for the right of publicity).
30. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (“What [the defendants]
sought was an attribute of Midler’s identity. Its value was what the market would have paid for Midler
to have sung the commercial in person.”); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254,
261 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (“[T]here is no free ride. The commercial hitchhiker seeking to travel on
the fame of another will have to learn to pay the fare or stand on his own two feet.”).
31. Czarnota, supra note 23, at 511.
32. Id. at 513.
33. See John Gillison, Note, California’s Right of Publicity Undergoes a Significant Transformation:
Comedy III Productions, Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 29 W. St. U. L. Rev. 359, 362–63 (2002).
34. Blair Joseph Cash, Note, “Hasta La Vista, Funny Guys”: Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Fictional

Voice Misappropriation Lawsuit Against Comedians Imitating His Voice and the Case for a Federal
Right of Publicity Statute, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 207, 211 (2010).
35. Bridgette Marie de Gyarfas, Right of Publicity v. Fiction-Based Art: Which Deserves More
Protection?, 15 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 381, 385 (1995).
36. See Stephano v. News Grp. Publ’ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 586–87 (N.Y. 1984) (finding no
common law right of publicity claim exists because the New York Civil Rights Law encompasses right
of publicity claims).
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only when the work in question was obviously commercial speech.37 This

is because commercial speech warrants a lower level of First Amendment
protection than noncommercial speech.38 However, when the allegedly
infringing work did more than simply “propose a commercial transaction,”
or when any commercial aspects were “inextricably entwined” with
expressive elements of the work as a whole, courts often refused right of
publicity protection.39 By distinguishing between “commercial” and
“noncommercial” use, the California courts struck a balance between
protecting artists’ right to express themselves and holding parties liable
when they take advantage of celebrities’ fame to promote sales of
specific products.40
For example, in Aldrin v. Topps Company, Inc., the Central District
of California denied astronaut Buzz Aldrin’s right of publicity claim
against a trading card company that used his photo on its cards without
his permission because the company’s use was not “commercial.”41 The
court defined commercial speech as doing “‘no more than propos[ing] a
commercial transaction,’ and simply advertis[ing] something for business
purposes.” The Aldrin court found that the “speech” in the trading card
was the product itself, and was therefore protected.42 Thus, prior to
Keller, California courts intimated that the right of publicity only
protected the economic interests of celebrities. The courts were primarily
concerned with whether companies or individuals used a celebrity’s likeness
to sell products without the celebrity’s authorization. As explained by
California state courts, such unauthorized use circumvented celebrities’
ability to benefit from their identity’s economic value, that is, through
licensing fees to advertisers.43 Depictions used outside of the advertising
realm were generally protected because they were not considered purely
commercial speech.44

37. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–86 (9th Cir. 2001); Aldrin
v. Topps Co., Inc., No. CV 10-09939 DDP (FMOx), 2011 WL 4500013, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27,
2011); cf. White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc. (White II), 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) (“The majority dismisses the First Amendment issue out of hand because [Defendant’s]
ad was commercial speech.”).
38. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623–24 (1995); Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184–85.
39. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184–85.
40. Id. at 1184–86. There are different levels of commercial and noncommercial speech. In the
interest of brevity, “noncommercial speech” as used in this Note refers to speech that does not merely
“propose a commercial transaction.”
41. Aldrin, 2011 WL 4500013, at *2–3.
42. Id. at *2 (quoting Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 905 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010)). In other
words, the court distinguished between speech used to sell an item from speech contained within the
item for sale.
43. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001) (“[D]epictions of
celebrities amounting to little more than the appropriation of the celebrity’s economic value are not
protected expression under the First Amendment.”); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 477 (Cal. 2003).
44. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 441 n.16 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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In addition to the noncommercial speech exception to the right of
publicity, California courts traditionally recognized a transformative use
exception, which the California Supreme Court established in Comedy III
Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.45 The courts based this exception,
in part, on the fair use test employed in copyright law.46 The transformative
use exception prevents a celebrity from succeeding on a right of publicity
claim against an author whose work incorporates aspects of that celebrity’s
identity, so long as the work represents a transformation of the identity
into something new and distinct.47 The policy behind this exception
mirrors the policy behind the copyright fair use exception: authors
should be free to build on previous works in the expression of their own
artistic visions.48
Prior to Keller, the test for the transformative use exception was
whether a “celebrity likeness [was] one of the ‘raw materials’ from which
an original work [was] synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation
of the celebrity [was] the very sum and substance of the work in question.”49
The courts used this test to determine whether the product containing a
celebrity’s likeness was so transformed that it became “primarily the
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”50 For
example, the California Supreme Court, in Comedy III, found that a tshirt which depicted an exact rendering of each of the Three Stooges
failed this test because the images served as the practical substance of the
work rather than one of many raw materials combined to form a distinct
work.51 Furthermore, the “inquiry [was] . . . more quantitative than
qualitative, asking whether the literal and imitative or the creative
elements predominate[d] in the work.”52 The transformative use analysis
also accounted for the economic component of each possible violation by
considering whether “the marketability and economic value of the
challenged work derive primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted.”53
Before Keller and its contemporaries, application of the Comedy III
test focused on the allegedly infringing work as a whole to determine
whether it was transformative enough to qualify as the defendants’ own

45. 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001); see also Davis v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 10-03328 RS, 2012 WL
3860819, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012); Winter, 69 P.3d at 477; Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184–86.
46. See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 807–08 (focusing particularly on the first fair use factor, “the
purpose and character of the [new] use” in crafting the “transformative use” exception).
47. See id. at 808.
48. See id. at 807.
49. Id. at 809.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 810.
52. Id. at 809.
53. Id. at 810.
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expression, rather than merely the celebrity likeness itself.54 For
example, in Winter v. DC Comics, musicians Johnny and Edgar Winter
sued a comic book publisher for using their likenesses as characters in
one of its comic books.55 The court rejected their claims because the
“plaintiffs [were] merely part of the raw materials from which the comic
books were synthesized.”56 Thus, the Winter court focused on the comic
books as a whole and recognized their value as independent works of art
despite the incorporation of the rockers’ likenesses.

II. The Evolution of Publicity Rights Across Circuits
A. Right of Publicity in the Ninth Circuit After KELLER
The California cases leading up to and including Keller represent a
fundamental shift in how California courts and the Ninth Circuit
approach the right of publicity. In Keller, the Ninth Circuit found that a
videogame publisher violated a former college football player’s right of
publicity.57 Sam Keller, who played quarterback for the Universities of
Arizona and Nebraska, sued EA Sports for the use of his likeness in its
popular “NCAA Football” videogame.58 The game consisted of lifelike
gameplay that included avatars of each team’s players but omitted the
actual names of the players.59 The dissent in Keller rightly pointed out
that the majority found that EA Sports had indeed violated Keller’s right
of publicity even though NCAA bylaws forbid its players from earning
any money from their college athlete status.60 However, this decision is
incongruent with how courts have traditionally applied the noncommercial
speech and transformative use exceptions.
First, EA Sports’ use of Keller’s likeness within the game is not
purely commercial speech insofar as his likeness is not employed to
simply “propose a commercial transaction.”61 All professional works of
art are, of course, commercial in the sense that they are bought and sold in
commerce. However, the First Amendment affords less protection only
to those works that directly propose a commercial transaction.62 Here, as

54. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 478–79 (Cal. 2003); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1285 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The
salient question is whether the entire work is transformative, and whether the transformative elements
predominate, rather than whether an individual persona or image has been altered.”).
55. Winter, 69 P.3d at 476.
56. Id. at 479.
57. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1284.
58. Id. at 1271.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
61. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–86 (9th Cir. 2001); cf. Aldrin v.
Topps Co., Inc., No. CV-10-09939-DDP (FMOx), 2011 WL 4500013, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2011).
62. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184–86.
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in Aldrin, the game is the speech, not a mere transaction proposal, and
therefore should receive greater First Amendment protection.63 Keller’s
avatar is merely one in a line of many characters integral to the gameplay
itself, not an advertisement for the game. However, the Ninth Circuit did
not conduct a commercial/noncommercial speech analysis; instead it
focused largely on the transformative use defense.64 Had the court
employed such an analysis and found that the game qualified for
heightened protection, it would then have moved on to an “actual
malice” standard, which would likely have ended in a finding that the
speech was protected by the First Amendment.65
Second, the Keller court erroneously applied the Comedy III
transformative use test. The court almost entirely focused on the literal
depiction of the Keller character rather than on the other elements of the
game, which directly conflicts with the wording of Comedy III’s
transformative use test.66 In Comedy III, the court consistently referred
to the transformative elements of the work as a whole, rather than those
of the individual likenesses.67 Furthermore, the Keller court ignored
other aspects of the Comedy III transformative use test, including
whether the marketability and economic value of the challenged work
derived primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted or whether the
artist’s skill and talent was manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of
creating a conventional portrait of the celebrity.68 Finally, the Ninth
Circuit largely relied on an aspect of the transformative use test from a
California appellate court decision (which is nonbinding on the Ninth
Circuit) that went unmentioned in Comedy III.69 It heavily weighed the

63. See id.
64. See generally Keller, 724 F.3d 1268.
65. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184–85. “Actual malice” is a standard applied to publications that
include false and defamatory material “with knowledge of falsity or with a reckless disregard for the
truth.” Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 658 (1989). Therefore, because
Keller involved no allegation of defamatory or misleading speech, it is doubtful that the court would
have found actual malice.
66. Comedy III consistently refers to the transformative elements of “the work” rather than the
individual rendering of the celebrities. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797,
808–10 (Cal. 2001).
67. Id.
68. In its transformative use analysis, the Keller court focused almost entirely on the fact that the game
realistically portrays college football players “in the context of college football games,” but neglected to
mention the relative fame (or lack thereof) of the plaintiffs or whether the goal of the game manufacturer
was simply to create a conventional portrait of the football players. See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279.
69. In Keller, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on No Doubt v. Activision, which factored in the
“context” in which the celebrity was placed within an artistic work. Id. at 1278. The court in No Doubt
found that, because the work portrayed the plaintiffs’ likenesses in the context of “doing exactly what
they do as celebrities,” the work in question was not transformative enough to withstand a right of
publicity claim. No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 387, 410–12 (Ct. App. 2001).
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fact that Keller was displayed in the videogame playing football, the
setting in which he gained his fame.70
The Ninth Circuit’s selective application of the Comedy III
transformative use test is difficult to reconcile with the facts of Keller.
Keller’s likeness was one of the hundreds of other characters available
for players to select.71 Therefore, the game creators’ skill and talent
cannot be said to be subordinate to the goal of creating a portrait of
Keller alone. Additionally, the court ignored the creative elements of the
entire work outside the literal depiction of Keller.72 In so doing, the court
departed from a literal interpretation of the Comedy III test, which calls for
an investigation into whether a “‘work contains significant transformative
elements.’”73 Such a view restricts an artist’s ability to create a work that
includes a literal depiction of a celebrity, even if the additional creative
elements dwarf the depiction and combine to form “the defendant’s own
expression.”74 Finally, it is hard to imagine that all of the designers’ and
programmers’ skill and talent that went into the production of a highly
complicated and realistic game were used solely to depict Keller so as to
commercially exploit his fame rather than to simply create a realistic and
entertaining videogame.75
Third, in deciding in favor of Keller, the court ignored the
fundamental basis for the right of publicity, namely the protection of an
individual’s financial interest in her own likeness.76 In California’s
earliest cases, which analyzed both statutory and common law rights of
publicity, the courts underscored that the right of publicity was created to
protect a person’s interest in her own commercial value.77 Keller and his

70. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279.
71. Mary Catherine Moore, Note, There is No “I” in NCAA: Why College Sports Video Games

Do Not Violate College Athlete’s Rights of Publicity Such to Entitle Them to Compensation for Use
of Their Likenesses, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 269, 286–87 (2010).
72. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. 21 P.3d 797, 808
(Cal. 2001)).
74. Id. at 1274 (citing Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809).
75. See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 810.
76. See id. (recognizing protection of an individual’s financial interest in her own likeness as
fundamental basis for right of publicity).
77. In fact, in adopting the common law right of publicity, the Ninth Circuit distinguished
Prosser’s first three categories of the right to privacy from the fourth, which it eventually adopted as
the right of publicity. The first three privacy categories encompass a “direct wrong of a personal
character resulting in injury to the feelings without regard to any effect . . . on the . . . pecuniary
interest . . . of the individual,” whereas the fourth contemplates “the identity appropriated [having] a
commercial value [wherein] the injury may be largely, or even wholly, of an economic or material
nature.” Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1974) (emphasis
added). The California Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg
Productions. 603 P.2d 454, 457 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (“A prominent person has a
substantial economic interest in the commercial use of his name and likeness. This is entitled to
protection under the common law.”); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979)
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fellow plaintiffs, however, retained no commercial interest in their
likenesses when or after they played college football.78 As previously
stated, NCAA bylaws forbid all of its players from accepting
compensation from any source relating to their college careers, during or
after their playing years.79 Because the language of the bylaws precludes
college players from accepting payment for licensing their likenesses, EA
Sports cannot be said to have appropriated Keller’s commercial interest
in his own likeness. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit found for Keller,
noting that “‘[y]ears of labor may be required before one’s skill,
reputation, notoriety or virtues are sufficiently developed to permit an
economic return through some medium of commercial promotion. For
some, the investment may eventually create considerable commercial
value in one’s identity.’”80 However, the court remained silent as to
whether Keller ever created commercial value in his identity and ignored
the fact that regardless of the efforts he undoubtedly spent in honing his
football skills, the NCAA prohibited him from collecting any economic
return through commercial promotion. Therefore, the court departed
from its own precedent and separated the right of publicity from
economic harm, at least insofar as it applies to lost profits or economic
opportunities. This holding invites a new spate of plaintiffs who no longer
have to demonstrate the economic value of their identities to prevail on
right of publicity claims.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Keller broadens California’s right of
publicity law to encompass almost any work, however creative, that
incorporates an accurate likeness of a celebrity in the context in which
the celebrity gained her fame.81 The court also seems to have abandoned
its higher level of protection for noncommercial speech against right of
publicity claims.82 As the dissent rightly pointed out, this endangers the
creative use of prominent figures in many artistic contexts.83 In addition,
the decision further confuses the standard for right of publicity in
California and conflicts with many cases countrywide that protect the
First Amendment rights in such works.84 The Keller decision appears
also to abandon the requirement that the plaintiff maintain an economic

(determining that California’s statutory right of publicity “means in essence that . . . the public . . .
endows the name and likeness of the person involved with commercially exploitable opportunities”).
78. See Moore, supra note 71, at 284.
79. Id. at 278–79.
80. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1280
(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 804–05).
81. Id. at 1274–75.
82. See id. at 1271 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574–75 (1977)).
83. Id. at 1290 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[The majority’s] logic jeopardizes the creative use of
historic figures in motion pictures, books, and sound recordings.”).
84. Id. (“The majority’s holding . . . cannot be reconciled with the many cases affording such works
First Amendment protection.”).
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interest in her identity.85 This decision, and the general overbreadth of
California’s right of publicity as explored below, contrasts starkly with
the Second Circuit’s treatment of New York’s right of publicity law.86
B. Right of Publicity in the Second Circuit
Unlike California, New York does not recognize a common law
right of publicity.87 In fact, New York’s right of publicity is found within its
privacy rights statutes.88 Privacy rights differ from traditional rights of
publicity in that the right to privacy usually protects an individual from
the misappropriation of her name or likeness only, whereas the “right of
publicity protects an individual whose ‘name, likeness, or other indicia of
identity’ has been misappropriated.”89 By contrast, New York’s statutory
right of publicity does not even protect an individual’s likeness, but only
one’s “name, portrait, picture, or voice.”90
Furthermore, because the New York right of publicity spawns
directly from the right of privacy, courts within the Second Circuit apply
the right quite differently than does the Ninth Circuit, especially with regard
to celebrities.91 The Second Circuit recognizes a public figure exception,
which states that “in the case of a public figure—who by the very nature
of being a public figure has no complete privacy—no liability exists when
her name is used without consent.”92 New York courts recognize two
caveats to the public figure exception: (1) if the publication is “knowingly
false”; or (2) the work is considered a “blatant ‘selfish, commercial
exploitation’ of the individual’s personality.”93
The statute itself restricts its application to works related to
advertising or trade purposes, which limits the statute, in the celebrity
context, only to situations where the celebrity’s economic value (insofar
as their ability to license their name/portrait/voice) has been allegedly

85. See id. at 1282 (majority opinion).
86. Id. at 1279.
87. See Andrew T. Coyle, Note, Finding a Better Analogy for the Right of Publicity, 77 Brook. L.
Rev. 1133, 1155 (2012); see also 1 McCarthy, supra note 16, § 6.3 (identifying Alabama, Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin’s recognition of a right of publicity through common law, but not New York).
88. See Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 585 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he ‘right of publicity’ is
encompassed under the Civil Right Law as an aspect of the right of privacy.”); see also 1 McCarthy,
supra note 16, § 6.3 (identifying New York recognition of a right to publicity by statute).
89. Cash, supra note 34, at 216; see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1977);
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995).
90. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51 (McKinney 2014).
91. See Cash, supra note 34, at 215.
92. Rand v. Hearst Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 405, 410 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969), aff’d, 26 N.Y.2d 806 (N.Y.
1970).
93. Id.
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misappropriated.94 A further distinction between California’s and New
York’s treatment of the right of publicity concerns the geographic scope
of the right. In California, the right of publicity reaches outside the state
so long as the plaintiff resides in California.95 By contrast, the New York
statute only applies to violations that take place within state lines, that is,
when the violating publication or work is distributed within the state.96
Additionally, unlike California’s right of publicity, New York courts restrict
the right of publicity to the concrete aspects of an individual, as opposed to
pen names, stage names, surnames, personae, or fictional characters.97
Lastly, the Second Circuit has refused to recognize a postmortem right of
publicity, whereas California does.98 Therefore, New York’s right of
publicity is much more limited and provides greater First Amendment
protection to artistic works than California’s law.

III. The Current State of the Right of Publicity
The current nature of right of publicity law presents a litany of
issues for both the courts and would-be litigants. Because right of publicity
law differs from state to state, federal courts are commonly burdened
with interpreting different state laws, often in relation to a single party in
a single action.99
Keller provides the perfect example. Because the videogame at
issue was sold throughout the country, the plaintiffs invoked both
Indiana’s statutory right of publicity and California’s statutory and
common law rights of publicity.100 This type of venue/forum
gamesmanship forces courts to adjudicate the same conduct under
different rules. Furthermore, such a strategy greatly tips the balance in
favor of plaintiffs because it expands the scope of applicable law under
which the court may find infringement. Indiana, for example, protects the
broadest range of personality interests, including gestures and
94. See N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51.
95. See Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(“Plaintiffs are using California law to stop Host from displaying a copyrighted work in Kansas City
and Cleveland.”); White II, 989 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
96. See Cuccioli v. Jekyll & Hyde Neue Metropol Bremen Theater Produktion GMBH & Co.,
150 F. Supp. 2d 566, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); cf. Pearce v. Manhattan Ensemble Theater, Inc., 528 F.
Supp. 2d 175, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
97. See Seth A. Dymond, So Many Entertainers, So Little Protection: New York, the Right of
Publicity, and the Need for Reciprocity, 47 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 447, 459 (2003); compare Naked
Cowboy v. CBS, 844 F. Supp. 2d 510, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (underscoring that “right of privacy ‘does
not extend to fictitious characters adopted or created by celebrities’” (quoting Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571
F. Supp. 2d 446, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2008))), and N.Y. Civ Rights Law § 51, with Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc.,
125 F.3d 806, 810–11 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing California right of publicity law that extends to actor’s
depictions of fictional characters).
98. See Dymond, supra note 97, at 467–68.
99. See Moore, supra note 71, at 274–75.
100. See id. at 281–83, 286.
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mannerisms.101 Where will it end? There is nothing to stop plaintiffs from
invoking every state’s right of publicity against a successful videogame
producer or other national publisher of artistic material.
A. Statutory/Common Law Rights of Publicity
Conflicting statutory and common law rights of publicity within the
same and among different states can often create additional confusion
and inconsistency.102 In common law right of publicity jurisdictions, judges
must navigate claims without firm statutory guidelines, increasing the
likelihood that different judges will reach different outcomes on similar
subject matter.103 Statutory rights of publicity also come with their own set
of problems.104 For example, some states’ statutes enforce postmortem
rights of publicity while others do not, and statutory jurisdictions vary
widely in terms of remedies.105
B. Varying Geographical Scope
Geographical issues further compound confusion in the application
of the right of publicity.106 For example, because California’s common
law right of publicity extends to defendants outside of California for
conduct occurring within the state and to conduct outside of California
by defendants located within the state, and New York’s statutory right of
publicity only covers works published within New York, plaintiffs may be
encouraged to forum shop.107 Furthermore, unsuspecting defendants who
reside in New York and publish allegedly infringing works that depict a
California-based celebrity outside California and New York may find
themselves haled into court in California to defend a right of publicity
claim.
C. Federal Copyright Issues
A further source of inconsistency arises when a state’s right of
publicity conflicts with federal copyright laws, as it does in California.108
In Wendt v. Host, for example, two actors in the popular Cheers television
101. See Cash, supra note 34, at 222.
102. See id. at 221, 225–26.
103. Id. at 219.
104. Id. at 219–20.
105. Id. at 222–23. For example, some states offer varying statutory damages, whereas others may
only allow injunctive relief given the difficulty in calculating damages. Id. at 223.
106. P. Stephen Fardy, Feet of Clay: How the Right of Publicity Exception Undermines Copyright
Act Preemption, 12 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 443, 454 (2004).
107. See Cuccioli v. Jekyll & Hyde Neue Metropol Bremen Theater Produktion GMBH & Co.,
150 F. Supp. 2d 566, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[O]ut-of-state uses of plaintiff’s likeness for trade or
advertising purposes are not actionable under New York law.”); White II, 989 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir.
1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
108. See Cash, supra note 34, at 220–21.
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show prevailed on a right of publicity claim against a chain of bars.109 The
chains displayed two robots fashioned after the characters at several of
their locations.110 The Ninth Circuit found for the plaintiffs, even though
it determined that the robotic features did not constitute a likeness under
the statutory right of publicity because the robots did not look
sufficiently similar to the actors.111 Furthermore, the court found the
defendant violated plaintiffs’ rights of publicity despite the fact that the
defendant had obtained a copyright license on those characters.112 In effect,
the court suspended the copyright holder’s right to derivative works. The
court also gave the actors a property right over characters in which they
had no part creating.113
In reaching its conclusion in Wendt, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily
on its previous decision in White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.114
There, the court held that the use of a cartoon, wig-wearing robot in a
television advertisement violated Wheel of Fortune cohost Vanna
White’s right of publicity.115 Although the case did not directly invoke
copyright law because Samsung did not purchase a license from the
copyright holder, this decision still raises serious copyright concerns.116
Because the copyright owner created the “physically identifiable character
of ‘Vanna White,’” she represents a large part of the show’s copyrightable
subject matter and may even be a “copyrightable character in her own
right.”117 This decision illustrates how the common law right of publicity in
California has been broadened to remove federally guaranteed protections
from legitimate copyright holders and reinvest those protections as
property rights in celebrities’ own identities.
The decision in White also emphasized the possible circumvention
of the copyright parody exception.118 In copyright law, works that are
considered sufficiently parodic of the originals are generally exempt from
infringement under the “fair use” doctrine.119 Had the Wheel of Fortune
copyright holders filed suit against Samsung, the court could have
decided in favor of Samsung under the fair use exception; it could have
deemed the robotic cartoon a parody, and thus, non-infringing.120

109. Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 810.
112. Id. at 811.
113. See Fardy, supra note 106, at 465.
114. Wendt, 125 F.3d at 811.
115. White I, 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992).
116. See Fardy, supra note 106, at 460.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 460–61.
119. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994).
120. See id. at 579–80; Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 971
(C.D. Cal. 2007) (dismissing a copyright infringement claim brought by comedienne Carol Burnett
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The parody exception serves to deter litigants from bringing suit
against alleged copyright infringers who satirize other authors’ works.121
Therefore, the White decision “inhibits the ability of advertisers to
present parodies of celebrities to the public and limits a copyright owner’s
right to license derivative works if they portray a celebrity.”122 As Judge
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit noted in his scathing dissent in White, “[i]n
a case where the copyright owner isn’t even a party—where no one has
the interests of copyright owners at heart—the majority creates a rule
that greatly diminishes the rights of copyright holders in this circuit.”123
The Ninth Circuit has also found that the state right of publicity law
trumps copyright holders’ licensing rights with regard to musical
compositions.124 In Midler v. Ford Motor Company, the Ninth Circuit
held that Ford violated singer Bette Midler’s common law right of publicity
when it ran a commercial featuring a “sound-alike” artist singing one of
Midler’s songs.125 The court ruled for Midler, even though Ford’s
advertising company had properly purchased the license to the song from
the song’s composer.126 The decision prohibited the licensee from “fully
exploiting the license it had obtained for the song that Midler sang by
creating liability for hiring a Midler voice imitator.”127 Again, the Ninth
Circuit removed a right from the copyright holder, instead, giving it, as a
property right, to a celebrity who had no part in the creation of the work.
By contrast, New York jurisprudence not only refuses to recognize a
common law right of publicity,128 but also rejects the notion that its
statutory right of publicity protects plaintiffs from “look-alikes.”129
Furthermore, it remains unclear whether New York courts would apply
the voice provision of the statute to “sound-alikes.”130 This illustrates a
tendency in the Second Circuit to restrict its application of New York’s
right of publicity to plaintiffs’ actual voices and visages, rather than
imputing imitator’s characteristics to them. Thus, the Second Circuit
protects artists who, through no fault of their own, sound like other more
established or well-known artists. Restricting violations to appropriations
against the producer of The Family Guy television show because a cartoon depiction of her on the
show qualified as parody under the “fair use” exception test).
121. See Fardy, supra note 106, at 460–61.
122. Id. at 461.
123. White II, 989 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
124. See Fardy, supra note 106, at 455–59.
125. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
126. Id. at 462.
127. Fardy, supra note 106, at 457.
128. See Stephano v. News Grp. Publ’ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that a
professional model could not assert a cause of action for the right of publicity when his picture was
published in a magazine article without his consent).
129. See Dymond, supra note 97, at 406; Alison Sachs, Note, It’s Up to You, New York—It’s Time
for a Statutory Right of Publicity, 20 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 59, 68 (1995).
130. See Dymond, supra note 97, at 466; see also Sachs, supra note 129, at 68.
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of actual, physical aspects of the plaintiff encourages a fertile landscape
in which new artists can thrive.
D. Amorphous Definition of “Identity”
Finally, the Ninth Circuit has expanded California’s common law right
of publicity to stratospheric levels. California’s statutory right protects a
limited number of personality interests: name, voice, signature, photograph,
or likeness.131 However, as it stands today, the common law right has no
such restrictions. Initially, the only differences between the statutory and
common law rights of publicity were that the former required a
“knowing use” and contemplated “remedies [that] are cumulative and in
addition to any provided by law,” whereas the latter rejected “mistake
and inadvertence” as a defense.132 In listing these differences, the
California Court of Appeals did not mention other ways of appropriating
one’s identity that would be available in one cause of action over another.133
However, the Ninth Circuit continues to expand and reshape California’s
common law right of publicity, making it nearly unrecognizable from the
form it took when it was last examined by the California Supreme Court
in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, in 1979.134
In Guglielmi, the California Supreme Court rejected a postmortem
common law right of publicity claim brought by renowned silent actor
Rudolph Valentino’s cousin against producers of a TV movie that
fictionalized his uncle’s life.135 The court found that although the film
fictionalized Valentino’s life, the film warranted the same level of
constitutional protection as “the town crier with the daily news or the
philosopher with his discourse on the nature of justice.”136 Furthermore, the
court dismissed the plaintiff’s assertion that defendant’s use of Valentino’s
name and likeness increased the value or marketability of the film, which
would have diminished its constitutional protection.137 The court

131. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a) (West 2014).
132. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
133. Judy Lucas, California’s Right of Publicity: A Ninth Circuit Favorite, 3 J. Legal Advoc. &
Prac. 82, 84 (2001).
134. See id. at 85 (“Generally a federal court, in deciding a case based on state law, applies the law
as it believes the highest court in the state would apply it. However, the California Supreme Court has
not had the opportunity to decide a [common law] right of publicity case since 1979.”); see also
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 457 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (applying
common law right of publicity only to famous silent film actor Rudolph Valentino’s name and likeness
although the complaint additionally alleged personality).
135. Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 455.
136. Id. at 459 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
137. Id. This is because increased marketability denotes a higher level of commerciality and thus,
less protection. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185–86 (differentiating the level
of First Amendment protection for purely commercial “’speech that does no more than propose a
commercial transaction’” and speech whose “commercial aspects are ‘inextricably entwined’ with
expressive elements” (citations omitted)).
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reasoned that (1) “[t]he First Amendment is not limited to those who
published without charge”; (2) “[f]iction writers may be able to more
persuasively, more accurately express themselves by weaving into the
tale persons or events familiar to their readers”; and (3) “the range of
free expression would be meaningfully reduced if prominent persons in
the present and recent past were forbidden topics.”138 The court’s
recognition that works of art are fundamentally economic in nature, and
its proposition that artists should be allowed to incorporate prominent
persons into their works, underscored the court’s concern for protecting a
professional artist’s First Amendment right to artistic speech even if that
speech includes aspects of a celebrity’s identity. Furthermore, the court
fashioned its common law right of publicity only with regard to name and
likeness, not intangible aspects of Valentino’s “identity.”139
The Ninth Circuit, however, has taken upon itself the task of
expanding the definition so as to include any aspect of a celebrity’s
identity, tangible or not. No longer does California’s common law right
of publicity protect only personality interests covered by statute or merely
extend causes of action based on mistaken misappropriation. As Wendt,
Midler, and White demonstrate, the Ninth Circuit has imbued in celebrities
protectable property interests unrelated to their names, likenesses, and
even mannerisms. Wendt stands for the proposition that actors maintain
a property interest in characters in which they had no hand creating, and
to which the infringing material bears dubious likeness.140 Midler grants
property rights to a celebrity singer over someone else’s voice as used in
the performance of a composition whose copyright is owned by someone
else.141 Finally, White expands the concept of protectable identity rights to
include the amorphous evocation of a celebrity’s identity.142
By broadening the definition of the common law right of publicity,
the Ninth Circuit endangers First Amendment protection for purveyors
of both quasi-commercial and noncommercial speech and squarely pits
right of publicity protection against federal copyright protection.143 As a
result, emerging artists may find themselves limited in their commercial
opportunities if their voice happens to sound like another, more
established artist’s voice. Even more disturbing, young performers and
artists may be barred from sharing their craft if they even “evoke” the
persona of another celebrity in audiences’ minds.144 The former Chief
Judge of the Ninth Circuit, Judge Kozinski, has enumerated a laundry list

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 459–60.
Id. at 462; cf. White I, 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992).
See supra Part III.C; Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811–12 (9th Cir. 1997).
See supra Part III.C; Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462–63 (9th Cir. 1988).
White I, 971 F.2d at 1401 n.3.
See Lucas, supra note 133, at 90.
See White II, 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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of concerns about the court’s expansion of California’s common law right
of publicity, including: the stifling of creative forces; the reduction of the
public domain; exclusion of the right of parody; and the enforcement of
California’s right of publicity “way beyond California’s borders.”145
In addition to expanding the reach of California’s common law right
of publicity, the Ninth Circuit has also misconstrued the California Supreme
Court’s transformative use exception, further limiting artists’ ability to
incorporate celebrities’ likenesses into their works. The transformative
use exception focuses on the transformative elements of an entire
work.146 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Keller focused on the degree of
similarity between the plaintiff and the likeness itself.147 Keller also
created a de facto property right in one’s identity even when an artist’s
identity lacks economic value, which is at fundamental odds with the key
rationale underpinning the right of publicity in the first instance.148 The
current state of disarray throughout the nation, typified by the differences
between the Ninth and Second Circuits’ application of the right of
publicity and the Ninth Circuit’s overexpansion of celebrities’ rights in this
regard, necessitates a uniform federal right of publicity.149
Under the current state of right of publicity law, many plaintiffs may
be unaware of the states in which their right of publicity is protected, how
much of their personae is protected, and which remedies they may seek for
a violation. Furthermore, defendants may freely act in one state even
after being found liable for the same conduct under the laws of a different
state.150 Many plaintiffs may be forced to file different actions in different
states to seek relief for the same conduct. What’s more, plaintiffs may
receive different types of relief or none at all in each action.151 Authors
of creative works that include elements which may “evoke” the
personality of an individual are expected to know widely differing laws if
they wish to publish their works in more than one state in order to protect
themselves from litigation. For these reasons, all potential litigants would
benefit from a federal uniform right of publicity statute.

145. See id. at 1519; Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1288 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
146. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1285
(9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the Comedy III transformative use test,
when properly read, applies to a creative work as a whole).
147. Id.
148. See supra Part III; Moore, supra note 71, at 277–78.
149. Because advertising and commercial artistic works pervade all channels of interstate commerce,
Congress may presumably pass such a law under the Commerce Clause. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
150. For example, a defendant may be liable for an infringing advertisement in a state that
recognizes a right of publicity action, but then subsequently publish the same advertisement in a state
with more lax or no right of publicity law.
151. Bearman, supra note 2, at 100.
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IV. Uniform Federal Right of Publicity Statute: A Proposal
Rights of publicity vary dramatically by state, and courts have applied
those rights inconsistently. The resulting entertainment “legalscape”
necessitates a uniform federal right of publicity statute to inject stability
and confidence into this area of law. Such a statute would prevent one
state’s laws from applying to unsuspecting out-of-state defendants
because all states would have to abide by the federal law. This Note
proposes a four-factor federal statute designed to protect both artists’
creativity and the economic value of celebrities’ hard-earned fame, while
also maintaining the integrity of the federal copyright system and
freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.
A. Defined Identity Properties
First and foremost, the statute would protect a clearly delineated
and exhaustive list of personality interests: likeness, signature, and voice.
This would maintain consistency throughout the country and resolve
questions of what constitutes “property” with regard to identity.152
Furthermore, it would free up artists and performers to cultivate their
own personae without having to worry about inadvertently appropriating
established celebrities’ “identities.” This discrete list would only protect
corporeal characteristics belonging to the individual, resolving the
difficulties in a case like Midler. Under this law, a court facing a case
similar to Midler would not be able to invest in the plaintiff rights to
someone else’s voice.153 Moreover, copyright holders to compositions
would not lose their licensing rights where a “sound-alike” is hired to
perform her song. Celebrity singers might complain that such a statute
would open up the floodgates for “sound-alike” artists to profit from
their “distinctive voices,” siphoning off their commercial value. However, in
copyright law, Congress already allows sound-alike recordings in order to
prevent monopolies on musical compositions.154 Furthermore, the
publication of sound-alike recordings arguably increases the visibility of
the original artist, creating more commercial opportunities for them.
Finally, the use of “likeness” allows for some flexibility. Images come in
many shapes, sizes, and styles, and therefore, terms like “photograph”
and “portrait” are too restrictive and easy to navigate around.

152. It will correct issues of ambiguity and overbroadness that arise from decisions such as White,
what Judge Kozinski terms an “exclusive right to something as broad and amorphous as [the
plaintiff’s] ‘identity’.” White II, 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
153. As the court pointed out in Midler, the statutory right of publicity is of no avail because it
only covers a “person injured by another who uses the person’s ‘name, voice, signature.’” Midler v.
Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
154. See Rothman, supra note 9, at 219–20.
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B. Purely Commercial Works
Second, the statute should restrict prohibited uses to purely
commercial works. “Purely commercial works” shall be defined as works
that simply advertise a product, propose a commercial transaction, or
exploit the individual’s likeness as its primary purpose.155 This definition
would reinforce the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning pre-Keller.156 Further, it
harmonizes this concept with New York’s statutory requirement that the
infringing work be for “advertising purposes or for the purposes of
trade”157 and the Second Circuit’s “blatant selfish exploitation” standard.158
What’s more, restricting the applicability of the federal statute to
purely commercial works comports with the logic behind the Lanham
Act’s trademark false endorsement jurisprudence. The Lanham Act
provides for a false endorsement cause of action, which “‘prohibits the
use in commerce of a symbol or device likely to deceive consumers as to
the sponsorship or approval of goods or services.’”159 By providing a
similar cause of action under a federal right of publicity statute for the
misappropriation of non-trademarkable characteristics of a celebrity’s
identity, such as likeness and voice, the statute would provide for false
endorsement actions for subject matter not covered by the Lanham Act.
Finally, the “commercial purposes” clause implicitly incorporates the
“newsworthy exception” already observed by most courts.160 According
to this exception, because news publications—though technically for-profit
endeavors—do not inherently serve to propose commercial transactions,
they may freely use celebrities’ likenesses to report the news, so long as
such uses are truthful.161 The “purely commercial use” restriction would
therefore retain the newsworthy exception.
155. This final term, “exploitation of the individual’s likeness is the primary purpose of the work,”
would apply to cases such as Comedy III, where the product—in that case t-shirts depicting the Three
Stooges—while not used for advertising or to propose a commercial transaction, has the celebrities’
likeness as its primary appeal. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 802, 805 (Cal.
2001).
156. The definition previously adhered to in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., in which the
court found a magazine pictorial featuring a digitally altered image of Dustin Hoffman in his female
role in the film Tootsie donning a designer dress was not in violation of Hoffman’s right of publicity
because the creative elements were so intertwined with the commercial elements as to not qualify as
“purely commercial speech” that “does no more than propose a commercial transaction.” Hoffman v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–86 (9th Cir. 2001).
157. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51 (McKinney 2014).
158. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., No. 00-Civ.-2839 (JSR), 2003 WL 749422, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 5, 2003); Rand v. Hearst Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 405, 410 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
159. Traci S. Jackson, Comment, How Far Is Too Far? The Extension of the Right of Publicity to a
Form of Intellectual Property Comparable to Trademark/Copyright, 6 Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop.
181, 184 (2004) (citation omitted).
160. See Gil Peles, The Right of Publicity Gone Wild, 11 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 301, 303 (2004); see
also, e.g., Hilton v. Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 912 (9th Cir. 2009); Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing &
Publ’g, 208 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2000).
161. Obviously defamation laws would still apply.
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C. Economic Harm
Third, the federal statute would include a requirement that the
appropriation diminish the economic value of the individual’s identity in
order to merit a cause of action. This provision will resuscitate the right
of publicity’s initial justification as a property right because it ensures
that infringement only occurs when something of actual value is taken
from an individual. It would correct one of the issues that arises from the
Keller decision, which ignored the right of publicity’s original impetus
and opened the courts to plaintiffs receiving damages even when they fail
to demonstrate the economic value of their personae.162
D. Transformative Use Exception
Fourth, the statute will codify the California Supreme Court’s
transformative use test, excepting works which contain “significant
transformative elements” or in which “the value of the work does not
derive primarily from the [individual’s] fame.”163 The statute will ensure
that “work” will be defined as “work as a whole” so that the
transformative elements will not apply only to the actual likeness of the
individual. This will assure that a talented artist, who accurately and
skillfully depicts her subject and incorporates it into a work of art that
contains several transformative elements, will be protected from a right
of publicity claim. Furthermore, it will correct the Ninth Circuit’s
misreading of the Comedy III test in Keller and allow videogame
manufacturers use of players’ likenesses so long as such likenesses are
merely “raw materials” from which the overall work is synthesized.

Conclusion
Because over half of all states provide a right of publicity in
different incarnations, some statutory, some common law, some a
combination of both, and other states provide no such right at all, a
uniform federal right of publicity is long overdue. Given the confusion
and uncertainty surrounding the current state of right of publicity
jurisprudence, plaintiffs are at a disadvantage when they seek to protect
their hard-earned fame. Likewise, under the current scheme, defendants
who provide valuable commentary on public figures or transformative
works of art are subject to the erosion of their First Amendment rights
when they incorporate aspects of prominent figures into their work. The
creation of a uniform federal right of publicity will mitigate the confusion
and uncertainty under the current right of publicity framework and put
both sides of any potential litigation on more equal footing with regard

162. See supra Part III.
163. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 802, 810 (Cal. 2001).
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to their respective rights. Furthermore, by incorporating the
aforementioned provisions, the statute will rein in overreaching decisions
such as Keller. It will also ensure First Amendment protection for
current and future artists and celebrities, while also protecting public
figures from predatory commercial practices. Such a statute will reaffirm
the basic principles from which the right of publicity emerged. In doing
so, the statute will promote the twin social values of encouraging the
cultivation of public personae and preserving free speech vital to artists’
self-expression and a vibrant creative industry.
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